1. Recent commercial developments in the electricity industry have increased the commercial pressure on the Licensees - who have responded by downsizing and delayering. There is a limit to this process because the Licensees cannot delegate the responsibility for safe operation of any nuclear facility. To discharge this responsibility they need to retain sufficient internal expertise to be able to discharge their duties and responsibilities under their Nuclear Site Licenses.
2. The requirements of Nuclear Site Licensees are set down in Notes for Applicants (available from HSE Books: ISBN-0 7176 0795 X). The principles regarding a Licensee's own capability and expertise are set out on pages 9 and 10 of this document (paragraphs 39 to 43 and 46). NII's thinking on the specific requirements behind the principles has been developing since the publication of Notes for Applicants in 1994 - a list of relevant references is given at the end of this Appendix.
3. The trend in the nuclear industry is towards a higher reliance on external - usually contractor - expertise and staff. How then does the regulator decide whether the internal staffing retained within a Licensee is sufficient to meet the requirements of the Licensee's duties, in particular to understand and own work undertaken by others? Different terminology has been used to describe this particular requirement - intelligent customer, informed customer, informed client - but the principle remains the same. NII has chosen to use the term 'intelligent customer'. The basic concept of the 'intelligent customer' role and its requirements, as used for guidance in this audit, are set out below. The thinking on this subject continues to be developed within NII.
4. It is the regulatory view that the Licensee needs to retain an 'intelligent customer' capability, whatever else is outsourced. It is judged that if this capability is lost the Licensee is in danger of losing - or already has lost - the ability to understand the nuclear facility safety cases. As a result, the ability to operate the facilities safely is called into question.
5. What then does an intelligent customer group (ICG) have to be able to do? Clearly this group has to be able to understand the safety basis on which the Licensee operates. The ICG needs to be able to understand not only the information in the safety case, but also what is not there and to know what should be there. It has to be able to recognise the strengths and weaknesses in the case and how these will change over time, or when new problems arise. It has to be able to integrate the reality on the facility with the assumptions and requirements of the safety case - and spot the discrepancies.
6. This capability has to apply across the full range of the safety issues which are pertinent to the operation of the facility or facilities for which the Licensee holds nuclear site licenses. While information can be captured by a records system, the knowledge to interpret the information and apply it to new or changed situations resides solely in suitably qualified and experienced staff.
7. It is suggested that knowledge retention can be achieved if the Licensee maintains within its own organisation a core technical and managerial team that has, as a minimum, the following capability:
to set, interpret and deliver safety and engineering standards relevant to the business; to understand and support all aspects of the safety case and the facility operation over the full facility lifetime - including decommissioning and disposal; to maintain and develop the corporate memory; and to ensure suitably qualified and experienced staff are available to make the judgements pertinent to safety both now and in the future.
8. To achieve this capability, the Licensee will have to maintain a broad and up-to-date skills base within its organisation. This team can enable the Licensee to guarantee that, for work done in house or by a contractor, all the possible safety implications have been considered and are understood. This includes, for example: explicit and implicit assumptions, the suitability and limitations of chosen methodologies, the validity of input data and the use of approximations.
9. This requires the team to know what they don't know - and to know how significant is that lack of knowledge to the judgement being made. To do this, they need to be fully up to date; key detail can be lost without continuing 'hands on' practice.
10. It is suggested that, to remain suitably qualified and experienced, staff should actively practise and develop their specialist skills and be involved in activities such as: research and development associated with technical or organisational problems; the development and maintenance of standards (in-house, national and international); the fundamental evaluation of safety issues. The in-house team should do the original thinking in the areas where the Licensee's business presents particular hazards. In addition, if they are responsible for the specification, monitoring, and acceptance of work done by contractors they will need to be trained and up to date in the techniques for the control and direction of contract staff.
11. The in-house staff levels will be based on the perceived or predicted workload - but if these staff are to maintain their specialist expertise at a current professional level, the extent of their in-house duties will limit their ability to control contractor work. The combined professional and contractor control responsibilities is one of the factors which will determine how many in-house staff are needed. The ability to respond to the unforeseen (eg an unexpected technical issue, or sudden loss of experienced staff) is another factor. It is self evident that, since suitably qualified and experienced people take time to develop, the time horizon for their recruitment and career development will need to be sufficiently long. The Licensee will need to ensure there is a continuing supply of in-house experts. This will require policies on succession planning, personal and professional development.
12. It is worth noting that, if an adequate in-house skills base is available, the impact of the loss of a contractor will be minimised. Licensee staff will always be available to make professionally informed judgements on matters of safety, in the short and the long term.
13. Where safety issues have high hazard potential (for example, with a significant off-site or societal impact), the in-house team have to be capable of viewing the issue holistically to identify all relevant aspects that need to be addressed. If they cannot undertake the work themselves, they will need to be able to specify and lead the work of the suitable contractors. It will be their responsibility to review and accept the work of contractors and ensure that the information supplied by contractors is seamlessly integrated into the overall response to a given safety issue. The in-house team will be responsible for both the integrity of the safety cases (which are the basis on which the Licence holder discharges his duty of care under the Licence) and the implementation of the controls and limits on the facility derived therefrom. They will also be responsible for capturing and recording the corporate memory.
14. The simplest question is - could you do the work yourself if the contractor was to disappear? This is followed by the query - and when was the last time you actually did such work yourself?
15. There are many possible checks - including the range of skills, qualifications, recent training and work involvement - but current professionals in any area can usually recognise others from the same discipline. In addition, the type of work being carried out routinely within the Licensee will be an indicator of the current capability of the intelligent customer groups. These groups should be driving the thinking in areas where the Licensee's business presents significant hazards. Therefore, advice from contractors must be subject to informed and critical review - not just blind acceptance.
The following papers and documents all discuss, in some form, the concept of 'intelligent customer' and/or the requirements of the role:
Managing Technical Resources in the Nuclear Industry - A Regulatory Perspective
IMechE Seminar, September 1999, D Senior
Partnering in the Nuclear Industry - A Regulatory Perspective
BNES Alliancing Conference, June 1999, F Taylor and A Coatsworth
Regulatory Requirements for the Use of Contractors on Nuclear Licensed Sites
Nuclear Energy 1998, 37, No. 1, 55-58
Safety Audit of Dounreay 1998
HSE/SEPA Misc 148
Restructuring and Privatisation of the UK Nuclear Power Industry
HSE NUC 9, May 1996
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