GNN SCO/091/07 Date: 28 August 2007

ICL investigation: Completion of legal proceedings

The Health and Safety Executive (HSE) welcomes the completion of the criminal prosecution, which arose out of the joint investigation into the explosion and building collapse at the ICL site in Maryhill, Glasgow on 11 May 2004. 

ICL Plastics Ltd were today fined £200,000 at the High Court at Glasgow, having earlier pleaded guilty to a breach of Section 2 and Section 4 of the Health and Safety at Work Etc Act 1974, and associate company, ICL Tech Ltd were fined £200,000 after pleading guilty to a breach of Section 2 and Section 3 of the Health and Safety at Work Etc Act 1974.

Stewart Campbell, HSE Director Scotland said:

“Our first thoughts remain with the families and friends of those who died, and the many other people who were injured in this tragic incident. 

“The scale, complexity and challenge of our investigation was massive, and was pursued through an innovative joint investigation involving HSE/HSL, Strathclyde Police and Crown Office and the Procurator Fiscal Service (COPFS).  The investigation necessitated effective co-ordination and co-operation between the investigators and the commitment of substantial resource.  HSE/HSL drew on their investigative and forensic expertise to identify the cause of the explosion as a leak from a corroded pipe carrying Liquefied Petroleum Gas (LPG).  The LPG then accumulated in an unventilated room, and the ignition of this LPG caused an explosion of sufficient force to cause the building to collapse.”

Mr Campbell continued:

“It is important for all those affected by the explosion that lessons are learned and I would like to remind all users and suppliers of LPG of the risk from buried pipes carrying LPG, particularly when located near areas where gas can accumulate.  Everyone should ensure that problems which are out of sight are not out of mind.  The dangers posed by buried pipes can be overcome by a systematic approach to risk management and the findings of the investigation reinforce the need for effective arrangements for the maintenance, renewal or repositioning of buried pipes.  HSE strongly advises that buried metallic pipes are effectively corrosion protected and maintained, or replaced either with over ground pipes or buried plastic pipes constructed and installed to the appropriate standards.”

Mr Campbell concluded:

“I would like to pay tribute to all my staff and those of HSL who have dedicated much of the last three years to the investigation and who have responded magnificently to what has been an extremely testing investigation; they have been greatly helped in their work by excellent working relationship with Strathclyde Police and COPFS and the tremendous mutual support that has been evident throughout the investigation. “

Notes to editors

A basic fact sheet about the investigation is attached.

In summary (for full details, refer to indictment):

ICL Plastics Ltd were charged under Health and Safety at Work Act 1974 section 2 and section 4 in that they did not ensure the safety of their employees and others in that they failed to carry out a suitable and sufficient risk assessment or have a proper system to inspect and maintain the LPG pipe.

ICL Tech Ltd were charged under Health and Safety at Work Act 1974 section 2 and section 3 in that they did not ensure the safety of their employees and others in that they failed to carry out a suitable and sufficient risk assessment or have a proper system to inspect and maintain the LPG pipe.

Section 2 of the Health & Safety at Work Etc Act 1974 requires an employer to ensure, so far as is reasonably practicable, the health, safety and welfare of all his employees.

Section 3 of the Health & Safety at Work Etc Act 1974 requires an employer to conduct undertakings in such a way so as to ensure, so far as is reasonably practicable, that persons not in his employment are not exposed to risk to their health or safety.

Section 4 of the Health & Safety at Work Etc Act 1974 requires a person in control of premises to ensure, so far as is reasonably practicable, that those premises, and any plant or substances in the premises, are safe and without risk to health.

On conviction, on indictment, for an offence under sections 2 to 4 of the Health & Safety at Work Etc Act 1974, the penalty is an unlimited fine.

Stewart Campbell, HSE Director Scotland, and Trevor Johnston, Investigation Manager, will be available for interview after the hearing on 28 August.

A DVD prepared by HSE/HSL containing relevant photographs and video footage, will be available after the hearing either from COPFS or HSE.

Further information on demolition work can be found at www.hse.gov.uk

Issued by Government News Network Scotland: For further information  (Journalists only) Paul Burgess: 0131 244 9060; paul.burgess@gnn.gsi.gov.uk

ICL Plastics Ltd/ICL Tech Ltd investigation Fact Sheet

Date of incident: Tuesday 11 May 2004

Location:  Premises occupied by ICL Plastics Ltd and ICL Tech Ltd at Grovepark Mills, Hopehill Road, Maryhill, Glasgow, G20 7NF.

Brief Summary of Incident:  At approximately 12.00 noon an explosion occurred at the above location.  This caused the building to collapse, which resulted in the death of 9 employees and seriously injured 40 others including a member of the public.

Brief Description of Premises:  Grovepark Mills was originally built in 1878 as a weaving mill.  ICL plastics occupied the premises in 1968.  At the time of the incident there were 3 buildings on site; the main building (the site of the accident), the fabrication building and the Stockline Plastics building.  The main mill building consisted of a basement, ground and three additional floors.  The main production areas (coating shop and despatch area) were on the ground floor, and the office accommodation was on the second floor.  The basement, which was beneath the despatch area, had a ceiling, which comprised of a steel structure with concrete slab infill.  The main access to the building was via a yard on the south side of the building off Grovepark Place.  In the south corner of the yard was a Liquefied Petroleum Gas (LPG) tank.

Description of ICL Tech Ltd/ICL Technical Plastics Ltd:  ICL Technical Plastics Ltd were incorporated in Edinburgh on 26 November 1973.  The company changed its name to ICL Tech Ltd in 1999 and it is stated that the principal business activity of the company is “The manufacture of other plastic products”.

Details of the Joint Investigation:  It was announced on 19 May 2004 that the Health & Safety Executive (HSE) and Strathclyde Police would conduct a joint investigation reporting to the Area Procurator Fiscal.  A team of HSE inspectors and HSE/HSL specialists worked with police officers during the investigation.  The investigation followed lines of enquiry developed from possible causes of an explosion based on the examination of the site.  HSE submitted a report to the Procurator Fiscal in 2005.  The HSE investigation was led by Stewart Campbell, HSE Director Scotland, and the Investigation team manager Jim Young, HM Principal Inspector, with HM Inspectors, Bill Reilly, Stephanie Rafferty and Garry Stimpson forming the core investigation team.  Russell Breen, HM Principal Specialist Inspector , was the Technical Support Manager, with responsibility to coordinate the scientific and expert support assisted by HM Specialist Inspector, Mike Thompson.  A large number of other HSE staff have also been involved in the investigation, providing investigative support, or corporate or expert opinion, including Sandra Caldwell, Director, FOD, Ian Waugh, Head of HID Specialised Industries Division, and Penny Taylor HID/LPG policy.  HSL staff primarily involved included Dr Stuart Hawksworth and Dr Roy Parrott.  Since the investigation moved into the active prosecution phase, FOD’s work has also been supported by Jeanette Reuben, Head of Operations, and Trevor Johnson HM Principal Inspector, and HSL’s work taken under the overall supervision of Phil Heyes, Senior Investigation Manager. 

Summary of the Investigation’s main findings:

Clear evidence was found of forces characteristic of a gas or dust explosion having acted on the underside of a steel structure that formed the ceiling of the basement. These forces damaged the I-section steel frame, welds and checker plate.

From analysis of the mechanical damage to the steel structure, the explosion overpressure produced in the basement is at least 692 mbar (Equivalent to 7 tonnes per square metre), but may have been greater than this.

The overpressure produced during the explosion violently lifted and broke apart the dispatch floor/ground floor. This happened in a number of stages as the explosion developed over several seconds.  Initially it appears to have lifted the steel structure breaking it apart from its supporting legs.  The welds holding the checker plate covering in place then failed.  At some stage the concrete floor section also broke apart.  These events resulted in the explosion venting into the ground floor space above the basement causing the collapse of the building as the force of the explosion pushed the walls outward, allowing the floor supports to fall.

A number of potential sources for the explosive atmosphere were identified which include LPG, natural gas and possibly organic dusts or solvents. However, the evidence indicated that of these the only credible source of the explosive atmosphere was a leak from a failed underground LPG pipe.  The pipe was not installed nor maintained to an acceptable standard.

The failure in the LPG pipe was adjacent to the basement wall, and tracer gas testing showed the availability of a leakage path from the failure to the inside of the basement.  An investigation of the potential for the occurrence of flammable gases in the ground at the ICL site revealed a plume of propane in the ground consistent with leakage from the LPG supply pipe.

From the evidence available the explosion did not involve mains natural gas, process dust or solvent, as they were not present in the basement nor the ground floor dispatch area above the basement.  There is no credible mechanism for flammable atmospheres of natural gas, dust or solvents to have entered the basement.

The possibility of explosive gases from natural sources, e.g. coal seams, was fully considered and its likelihood was determined as remote.

Reasonable Practicable Precautions: 

The approach HSE recommends to employers who use LPG:

• Make sure that problems which are out of sight are not out of mind.
• Ask - do you have a LPG supply?
• If you have LPG —where does the pipework go?
• If sections are buried — is it metal and is it protected?
• If it is not protected against corrosion, then its condition should be urgently assessed, and if necessary the pipework taken out of use.
• If you have corrosion-protected buried metal pipework, you need competent advice on a scheme of inspection and maintenance;
• But this may not be easy (competent advice difficult to obtain, or buried in an awkward position), so two simpler options — put it above ground, OR replace by plastic piping and mark clearly (plastic pipe will have a normal life expectancy and can then be replaced);
• Remember problem is worse and needs an enhanced precautionary approach, if buried pipework near low areas where gas can accumulate.

All commercial/industrial users of bulk LPG should already have been approached by their suppliers and provided with a guidance leaflet; if you have not been, then contact your LPG supplier.

Properties of LPG:  LPG is a generic term for gases, most commonly propane and butane, having the characteristic of being easily liquefied by application of moderate pressure.  A litre of liquid LPG will provide approximately 250 litres of gas.  LPG is approx 11/2 times heavier than air.  LPG forms a flammable vapour when mixed with air in proportions of between approximately 2% and 10%.